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A Functional Analysis of the EBRD
Model Law on Secured Transactions,
2
by John A Spanogle
I. Introduction.
This artide is intended to present a functional analysis of the EBRD Model Law on
Secured Transactions. The functional analysis is the primary presentation method of the
common law tradition in evaluating proposed legislation. It examines both the goals and
the practical effect of the proposed statutory provisions. For proposed commercial legislation, this means evaluating what economic activity it seeks to promote, and then attempting to determine whether it is likely in fact to facilitate such economic activity. Each provision is examined to ascertain in what ways it obstructs or facilitates the economic activity
sought; and then is compared to alternative approaches that might better obtain the perceived goals. Thus, the analysis concentrates more upon suggesting compromises between
competing economic interests than in arranging the harmonization of competing legal
doctrines.
Other scholars, primarily those from the civil law tradition, will present conceptual
analyses of the EBRD Model Law in this collection of papers. This article is intended to
present a wholly different, but complementary approach. In fact, many of the problems
which are raised and discussed in a functional analysis are the same ones raised and discussed in a conceptual analysis. And, as the paper presented by Professor Kreuzer dearly
shows, each type of analysis often reaches the same conclusions, even though starting from
very different foundations and assumptions.
The recommended goal of the enactment of the EBRD Model Law is to set up a commercially useable secured financing system. It is not necessary to try to set up a perfect
secured financing system. It is only important to establish a commercially usable system to
gain experience under it and to realize what the full range of its benefits can be. Such a
system can be improved later, relying on that experience and the impetus gathered from
the initial benefits.
There are two questions which should be asked in any functional analysis of the EBRD
Model Law on Secured Transactions: 1) what conduct does society seek to encourage from
such a creditor by enacting this Model Law?; and 2) will this Model Law induce the potential creditor to take such action?

1.
2.

Parts of this paper are based upon memoranda submitted by the author to the World Bank.
However, the views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author, and are not attributable
to the World Bank. All rights reserved.
William Wallace Kirkpatrick Professor of Law, George Washington University School of Law,
Washington, D.C., USA.
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II. What Conduct Does Society Seek from a Potential Secured Creditor
by Enacting the EBRD Model Law?
The purpose of the EBRD project to write a Model Law on Secured Transactions is to
present a device for cost-effective asset-based financing to Central and Eastern Europe. If
secured financing is effective, there should be a difference between the credit terms given
to a borrower who gives collateral and a borrower who gives none, when each is otherwise
equally creditworthy. The borrower who grants security to the lender should get a better
rate, greater credit availability or a longer duration loan, because the secured creditor has
less risk. If the debtor defaults in his payments, the secured creditor should be able to realize on the valueof the collateral, and be repaid through the proceeds of the collateral.
What is meant by a commercially effective secured financing system? The basic economic definition is that the collateral must have sufficient economic value to a potential
secured creditor to induce that creditor either (1) to give credit at a preferential interest
rate or, (2) to make more credit available than the creditor would have granted if the loan
was unsecured. In many legal regimes, creditors take security on all loans, but consider the
collateral to have no actual economic value. In such loans the interest rate is the same as it
would have been for unsecured credit, instead of being lower; and the amount available is
also the same, so there is no benefit to the debtor from its grant of the charge.
Thus, the conduct sought by society from a potential secured creditor is not merely
that it receives a benefit by taking an interest in the collateral. Instead, the conduct sought
by society is that a potential secured creditor gives benefits to the debtor in return for
obtaining its interest in the collateral. What is the underlying economic rationale for such
conduct by the potential secured creditor?
One type of effective secured financing system is one in which a creditor makes
secured loans at a lower interest rate than unsecured loans because of the protection it perceives to be given by the collateral (assets). The interest rate demanded by creditors
depends in part upon their assessment of the risks involved in making a particular loan. If
the security from collateral can reduce risk of loss after non-payment, a lender can reduce
the interest rate charged on a secured loan. In other words, the goal is a two-tier interest
rate system, with lower rates being charged for secured loans than for unsecured ones.
Alternatively, a secured creditor can make a larger secured loan to a debtor than it
would make on an unsecured loan, again because of the perceived protection of the collateral. There are many ineffective secured financing systems in this world, in which the
lender takes a security in the debtor's collateral, but perceives no significant protection
arising from the collateral. In ineffective systems, this secured creditor charges the same
interest rate, and grants no more credit, than it would for an unsecured loan.
We all wish to avoid creating an ineffective system, and that will depend upon whether
creditors perceive that secured loans involve significantly less risk that the loan funds will
be lost. That perception, in turn, depends upon whether the creditor determines that it
will receive adequate protection from the collateral, or from the proceeds of the sale of the
collateral, if the debtor cannot make the payments. The creditor makes this determination
by: 1) appraising the value of the collateral; 2) determining the cost of obtaining protection; 3) determining the cost of enforcing his interest; 4) determining how much of that
value will be obtained by sale of the collateral after default; and 5) determining whether
and how much of that value will be paid to the secured creditor. If the creditor believes
that only 10% of the value of the collateral will be paid to it through the sale process, it will
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require the debtor to put up collateral worth ten times the amount of the loan before considering the collateral to have any value to it Only then will the creditor determine that
the collateral gives enough protection from risk of non-payment to reduce the interest rate

charged.
In addition, the potential secured creditor will want to know whether its interests are
protected from, and take priority over, the claims of the third parties both before and after
any default by the debtor.

III. How Effectively Does the EBRD Model Law Induce a Potential
Secured Creditor to Give Value for the Collateral?
This analysis approaches the EBRD Model Law from the perspective of a potential
secured creditor. There are five basic questions which a potential secured creditor will ask
in evaluating its position, and the worth of the collateral to it, under any secured financing
regime: 1) does it cost a lot to createan enforceable charge?; 2) does it cost a lot to enforce
the charge?; 3) does enforcement of the charge provide real commercial value for the creditor?; 4) can potential secured creditors determine, with certainty and at little cost, before
the loan is made, whether any other creditor will have a better claim to the charged property (collateral)?; and 5) is the secured creditor protected from the claims of third parties,
including other creditors, the trustee in bankruptcy, purchasers and statutory claimants?
In addition, secured financing should be available to all creditworthy borrowers from
a wide range of different types of creditors, to provide competition in this lending market-

place.
A. DoEs IT COST A LOT TO CREATE AN ENFORCEABLE CHARGE?
In different jurisdictions, there are various types of non-possessory registered security
interests, ranging from the chattel mortgage to the former American "trust receipt," to the
current British "charge." The primary concept underlying all of them is the creation of a
secured financing device which uses a registry to give public notice of the financing, so
that all creditors can know the current financial position of a potential borrower before a
loan is made to the borrower. For these devices to be legally useful, "constructive notice,"
not "actual notice," concepts must be applied to all secured creditors who lend to a particular debtor. Otherwise, a subsequent creditor or purchaser could claim to have made a
loan "in good faith" without looking at the public register and thus without actually knowing of prior charges on the property. Constructive notice concepts impute knowledge of a
public filing to all the world, induding subsequent creditors, whether they have actual
knowledge of it or not.
The commercial usefulness of these financing devices has usually depended upon
three subsidiary concepts: the collateral should be allowed to be described generally; afteracquired property should be covered by the security interest; and the debt should include
future advances. Thus, the commercially useful financing device, in addition to having
registration and constructive notice concepts, will allow the secured creditor to claim an
interest in a shifting stock of generally described goods without day-to-day accounting of
the balance outstanding.
The registered charge proposed by the EBRD Model Law achieves these goals. It
requires the registration of a "registration statement." (Art. 8) The registration statement
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may be a different document than the credit agreement between the parties (the "charging
instrument"). This is an important feature, allowing the parties to give public notice of the
existence of their secured transaction without revealing all of the financing terms of that
transaction. However, at a minimum, the registration statement must disclose the existence of the secured transaction and identify the parties, the collateral, and the secured
debt. The collateral may be described either generally or specifically. If generally
described, it can include after-acquired property conforming to the general description.
The secured debt may also be described either generally or specifically and this allows a
generally described debt to include future advances up to a stipulated maximum amount.
The registration system is only outlined in the Final Draft of the Model Law. (Art.
34.) It attempts to reduce the time delay problems associated with the registry courts of
Central and Eastern European countries by: 1) limiting the number and type of issues
which can be examined by the registrar; and 2) by requiring the time of presentation for
registration to be marked and used for priority-setting, rather than the time of the registrar's approval. The registrar may reject a registration statement if it "does not comply
with the requirements of" the Model Law, and the drafters have attempted to keep those
requirements simple. They basically require only the "identification" of the parties to the
transaction, the secured debt and the charged property. That probably simplifies the
requirements of registration as much as language can achieve, although registry courts in
Central and Eastern European countries have shown a remarkable ability to find unexpected items to investigate. In particular, the concept of "identification" of the parties is
not defined and could be abused but the Model Law drafters have made the principle crystal dear.
For lenders, the ease of creation of the charge is handled well. A lender needs to
obtain from the debtor a signed charging instrument and a signed registration statement.
Each document is simple, and registration is straightforward. However, the Model law
does not say anything about registration fees. Stamp and other taxes can exceed 2%, and
be a significant cost barrier which inhibits the use of secured financing. Thus, they should
be discouraged. The Model Law should provide that registration fees are limited to the
actual cost of registration, rather than being regarded as a revenue source. It seems dear
that neither the charging instrument nor the registration statement need to be notarized,
but (especially for civil law countries) this fact should be stated expressly.
B.

DOES

IT COST A LOT TO ENFORCE THE CHARGE?

The only provisions on enforcement of charge allow the chargeholder to enforce the
charge only if "there is a failure to pay." (Art. 22.1.) No other breach of the creditor-debtor
agreement seems to create any powers over the charged property under the Model Law.
Such breaches can include failure to insure the property, failure to maintain it, removal of
the property from the statutory jurisdiction, use for illegal purposes, and failure to collect
accounts or present instruments or enforce rights, etc. Upon the happening of any of
these events, the status of the chargeholder toward the property depends upon the contract
(charging instrument) between the parties. The drafters of the Model Law assume that
this contract will be long and complicated, and will spell out not only a series of "events of
default," but will also incorporate an "accreditation clause" making the entire secured debt
immediately payable if any events of default occur. With such a contract, the credit can
begin enforcement against the charged property any time payment of the total outstanding
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balance is demanded and not paid.
After a "failure to pay," the chargeholder must first deliver an "enforcement notice" to
the debtor (Art. 22.2), and then register that enforcement notice within seven days. (Arts.
22.4 and 33.1.6.) The delivery and registration of the enforcement notice entitles the
chargeholder both to take "protective measures" and to "realize the charge." "Protective
measures" (Art. 23) include taking possession of the charged property, using a "[bailiff]" to
take possession, immobilizing it, or any "measures as agreed with the chargor." (Art. 23.6)
There are no limitations on the latter power, and the Model Law does not specify whether
the "agreement" can be boiler-plate clauses in the charging instrument or must be a negotiated, post-default arrangement. If it is the former, it may be expected to be fairly draconian since the contract will be drafted by the creditor.
The possibilities under the Model Law for litigation, and the delay and uncertainty
created by litigation, are enormous. The debtor or third parties can seek court intervention to declare the enforcement notice invalid (Art. 22.4.2), resolve disputes between
debtor and creditor over the creation, validity and enforceability of the charge (Art. 29.1),
resolve priority disputes between chargeholders, determine whether improper protection
measures were taken (Art. 29.5), order "appropriate" protection measures (Art. 23.5),
determine whether the chargeholder obtained a "fair price" (comment to Art. 24.3.1), and
invalidate clauses in the charging instrument. (Art. 24.2.)
To summarize, the Model Law takes many steps to reduce enforcement costs. After a
default, the chargeholder delivers an enforcement notice to the debtor, then registers it.
The chargeholder is then permitted to take possession voluntarily or to immobilize the
charged property. If the debtor resists, the chargeholder can obtain the assistance of a
"[bailiff]" without first obtaining a court order. The debtor does have many opportunities
to litigate several aspects of this process. The chargeholder may obtain further enforcement devices by stipulating them in the contract. It is not clear whether these further
devices are limited in any way which could be abusive.
C. DOES ENFORCEMENT OF THE CHARGE PROVIDE REAL COMMERCIAL VALUE FOR THE CREDrIOR?
There is always some uncertainty about valuing collateral. The collateral may be difficult to appraise because it has a limited market or depreciates over time, or is subject to
fashion or technological obsolescence. At the time the loan is made, it may be difficult to

determine the amount of value that will be obtained at a later sale after default, because a)
market conditions can change, b) the mercantile expertise of the people running the sale
may be limited, and c) the results of "distress sales" are somewhat unpredictable.
Under the Model Law,.the chargeholder controls the manner of the sale of the repossessed charged property (Art. 24.4.), but is required to realize a "fair price." (Art. 24.3.1.)
This would be a positive step in most Central and Eastern European nations, where court
enforcement officers usually are the only persons allowed to sell property free and clear of
prior encumbrances. This provision of the Model Law will permit use of the private sector
to seek prices closer to market value. The sales by court officers are recognized as "distress
sales" and bring distress sale prices. Under the Model Law, normal commercial processes
will be available, and can bring normal commercial (albeit wholesale) prices.
However, it is not until sixty days after delivery of the enforcement notice, that the
chargeholder "may" sell the charged property. (Art. 24.) There does not seem to be any
provision requiring the chargeholder to sell repossessed charged property. Thus, the only
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protection for the debtor's equity interest in the charged property is the sixty day period
when apparently it may redeem the property by tendering the total outstanding balance.
Experience under most Common Law systems has indicated such redemption will be
unlikely. The effect of the delay if the charged property is fresh produce, fish, trendy
clothes, or a volatile stock would be unfortunate for both creditor and debtor, but no
exceptions are stated in the Model Law. A new bureaucracy called a "proceeds depository"
is created to disburse the sale proceeds. A buyer of the repossessed charged property gets
good title only if the sale proceeds are paid into the proceeds depository.
Most of the enforcement mechanisms seem designed primarily for a special type of
charge called an "enterprise charge" (Art. 5.6), which can be taken over the entire assets of
a corporation. (Art. 6.6.) Many components of the Model Law are driven by the needs of
the enterprise charge, and the Model Law drafters may have contemplated it as the normative registered charge. The provisions on "enterprise charge administration" (Art. 25),
which concern enforcement of enterprise charges, are as long and more detailed than the
enforcement provisions for all other forms of charges. (Arts. 22-24.) The provisions on
the proceeds depository administration are of equal length and detail. (Art. 27.)
Thus, in realizing value, the Model Law is helpful in permitting the chargeholder to
control any sale of the repossessed charge property, so that it can maximize the value
received if it chooses to do so. It is unclear whether the chargeholder is required to sell
after repossession. There are two major restrictions in the Model Law on any such sales.
One is that the sale cannot occur until sixty days after the enforcement notice is delivered.
The value of the charged property could fall rapidly during that period for a wide variety
of reasons. The second is that a bureaucracy called a Proceeds Depository is created, and
usually must be used, and its costs may reduce the value received by the chargeholder.
D.

CAN POTENTIAL SECURED CREDITORS DETERMINE, WITH CERTAINTY AND AT LITTLE COST,
BEFORE THE LOAN IS MADE, WHETHER ANY OTHER CREDITOR WILL HAVE A BETTER CLAIM
TO THE CHARGED PROPERTY?

Under the EBRD Model Law, between "registered charges," the first to register has priority over all other registered charges, regardless of the actual knowledge by later chargeholders concerning prior registration. Thus, the doctrine of constructive notice is applied
to all creditors who obtain a registered charge. Such registered chargeholders will need to
check the registry to determine whether there are any prior registered charges or risk having only a secondary priority to the charged property.
Any person is permitted access to the registry, after paying the necessary fee, to ascertain whether there are any registrations of prior charges. An important point is that one is
not required to prove any particular relationship, or obtain any permission, in order to
search for public record information on a potential borrower. Such ease of access to
information is a necessary condition for the operation of constructive notice concepts.
However, there are no time limit provisions on how quickly the registrar must "accept" a
registration statement. Since loan funds will not be disbursed until after such acceptance,
delays of the length now occurring in Central and Eastern European registry courts could
still be a problem. There are also no provisions on the liability of the registrar, or the entity
maintaining the register, for mistakes, negligence or other risks in handling the registration
applications, information or access.
The types of registry indices or other recall capabilities are also not specified. Finally,
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the issue of the amount of fees for registering statements or accessing information is not
addressed. Some Central and Eastern European countries may be planning to use these
registries to raise significant amounts of money, and they should be warned, at least in the
commentary, that the economic growth effect could be short-circuited by an overcharging
registry system.
However, not all charges need to be registered under the EBRD Model Law, and these
unregistered charges can have a "super-priority" which will defeat the interests of the registered chargeholder. One such exception is the "unpaid vendor's charge"; another is the
possessory charge.
The unpaid vendor's charge is an unregistered title retention device, similar to the
conditional sale or the Romalpa clause. Commercially, it creates problems because it arises
out of the manipulation of doctrines concerning "legal tide" and there is no public notice
of the encumbrance. Usually it protects creditors who sell goods on credit, but not creditors who lend money. The former offer credit which is "tied" to sales only of their products, and which is usually only short term credit. On the other hand, under an effective
secured financing system, the latter can provide long-term financing for all necessary costs
of starting an enterprise.
Under the EBRD Model Law, an "unpaid vendor" obtains an unregistered charge
which gives that vendor priority over all registered charges. The unpaid vendor gets such
priority (a superpriority) whether it registers the charge or not, and whether its charge
arises before or after registration of other charges. (Art. 17.3.) This is truly a "superpriority" for the unpaid vendor. Further, there is no public disclosure of the existence of the
unpaid vendor's charge, so it is a secret encumbrance from the perspective of any potential
lender of funds. An unregistered "unpaid vendor's charge" lasts for six months or until the
vendor is paid. It can be converted into a registered charge at any time during that six
months. A chargeholder who is an unregistered unpaid vendor has all the enforcement
powers of a registered chargeholder.
The only requisite for a credit seller to obtain an "unpaid vendor's charge" is that there
be a "written agreement" between the credit seller and the debtor-buyer stating that the
credit seller "retains title" to the goods until paid. This condition is easily met, without
bargaining between the parties or any actual agreement, by a boiler-plate printed clause in
seller's "order acknowledgement form.' In most transactions, it will be the last form sent
by one party to the other, and its terms will control the agreement. (CISG Art. 19(1).)
Thus, in many transactions, not even the debtor will be actually aware of the existence of
the unpaid vendor's charge.
The combination of non-registration of the unpaid vendor's charge and its superiority over registered charges causes problems to the secured transactions system created by
the EBRD Model Law. One problem is that no lender with a mere registered charge can
grant a debtor any real security value for the debtor's inventory unless the lender is willing
to supervise the debtor's purchasing and bookkeeping operations to ensure actual payment of all suppliers. This would be very labor-intensive and increase the cost of inventory secured financing unreasonably. The same is probably true for loans on the debtor's
equipment, although probably less labor-intensive and costly.
Thus, registered chargeholders which are mere lenders and not sellers of goods have
only subordinate rights to inventory and equipment. That should make them hesitant to
enter into the type of long-term, general-purpose financing arrangements which can arise
under secured transactions legislation. On the other hand, "trade creditors" and other
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credit sellers are well protected and should be expected to increase their sales and credit
activity.
The "possessory charge" is the traditional pledge, but under the Model Law there are
new twists to the doctrines and new problems. Almost every jurisdiction, including the
Central and Eastern European nations, recognizes the security interest in which the creditor receives physical possession of the collateral from the debtor. It is believed that the
public, and other creditors, receive sufficient public notice of the creditor's interest from
the change of physical possession, and creditors are aware that they should check who has
physical possession before they grant credit based on ostensible ownership of property.
The difficulty is to restrict use of this device to only those transactions in which there is
actual transfer of physical possession. Over the years, most jurisdictions that do not have
effective registry systems have developed many sophisticated doctrines based on agency or
trust concepts which purport to be pledges but involve no transfer of physical possession.
Such doctrines allow secret encumbrances which can destroy the utility of a registration
system.
The EBRD Model Law is silent on one important issue. Many Central and Eastern
European nations have enlarged their concepts of "pledge" and "possession" because they
had limited effective registered financing devices. Thus, they have developed many sophisticated concepts of "constructive possession' in which the debtor keeps actual possession
of the collateral, but the creditor obtains a constructive possession recognized by the
courts of those nations, but which is not expected by a common law attorney.
The solution to such problems would have been for a possessory charge to require
actual physical delivery by the debtor of the charged property to the creditor, and retention
of that property by the creditor or an agent which is not the debtor nor related to the
debtor. Only by such restrictions could the Model Law have provided sufficient public
notice of its possessory charge and have overcome the current "constructive possession"
doctrines. The Model Law does not provide any such restrictions, however, and in fact
encourages the continuation of constructive possession concepts and their attendant secret
encumbrances.
First, the Model Law does not require any physical delivery by the debtor of the
charged property to the creditor to create a possessory charge (even though the property
must be "capable of delivery"). Instead, the Model Law only requires that one of three persons obtain "possession" of the property "before or after the date of the charging instrument." (Art. 10.1.) "Possession" is not restricted to actual, physical possession, but can still
include constructive possession. Second, this "possession" may be obtained by any one of
three parties. One is the chargeholder. A second is "a person nominated by the chargeholder" and the debtor is not excluded from that category. The third is "a person holding
on terms agreed between the chargeholder and the [debtor]", and neither the debtor nor
any agents of the debtor are excluded from this category.
The result of such statutory language is dear. The courts will read these provisions as
not requiring actual physical possession of the charged property by the creditor or a
known agent of the creditor, but as allowing use of any device which allows a finding of
technical possession by anyone designated by the creditor, or by both parties, including the
debtor. This merely continues the fictions of constructive possession doctrines and gives
no public notice of a possessory charge to those who choose to register their charges.
Well-advised creditors will seek to avoid registration and its incumbent fees when a simple
agreement will suffice which nominates the debtor as the agreed person to hold posses-
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sion. Thus, the Model Law's possessory charge subverts the non-possessory registered
charge both because it provides a substitute which is too widely usable, and because it promotes secret encumbrances which destroys the heart of the registration system.
The EBRD Model Law is really a tale of two different kinds of creditors, credit sellers
and lenders, which are given different status and rights. To understand the problems, a distinction must be made between these two types of creditors. A bank is a lender of money
to a debtor, but a manufacturer becomes a creditor by selling goods on credit and becoming (in the words of the Model Law) an "unpaid vendor" The bank or other lender will get
its rights to the collateral from the debtor through the secured financing agreement. The
credit seller (unpaid vendor) will get its rights to the collateral by "retaining tile" to the
collateral when it is sold and delivered to the debtor. Lenders have two costly choices: 1) to
try to re-arrange the transaction so as to pass title through them; or 2) to supervise the
debtor's financial operations enough to ensure payment of all trade creditors.
A credit seller can determine, before shipping goods to the debtor, that its claim to the
charged property will have priority over those of all other creditors, because of the superpriority given to credit sellers under Article 17.3.
A lender can determine, before making a secured loan, whether its claim to the
charged property will have priority over the claims of all other lenders, because of the first
to file priority rule of Artide 17.2. It cannot check the registration files and be certain
whether there are any credit sellers with unpaid vendor's charges which have priority over
its claims to inventory or to equipment, because those charges need not be registered; in
effect they are secret liens.
The economic effect is likely to be that lenders either will not attribute any serious
value to inventory or equipment as charged property, or they will have extra costs and risks
in obtaining charges on such property, and these will be passed on to the debtor. Under
the first approach, lenders will take charges on inventory and equipment, but will not
reduce rates or make more credit available because of the problematic nature of any actual
economic recovery from such property. Such use of secured credit would not be cost
effective.
Under the second approach, lenders could require the debtor to engage in periodic
"pay-out and pay-over" transactions to obtain protection from unpaid vendor's charges,
but such transactions are labor-intensive, costly, and not a cost-effective use of secured
financing. Alternatively, lenders could devote much time and energy toward designing
transactions which route "title" through them to the debtor, using bills of lading and other
devices. The law of conditional sales and trust receipts has numerous examples of success
and failure of such attempts. But these transactions, while imaginative, are not only risky
but also costly, and should be eschewed if possible.
E.

THE SECURED CREDITOR SHOULD BE PROTECTED FROM THE CLAIMS OF THIRD PARTIES,
INCLUDING OTHER CREDITORS, THE TRUSTEES IN BANKRUPTCY, PURCHASERS AND
STATUTORY CLAIMANTS.

The Model Law provides a concrete set of rules to determine priority among creditors,
although the secret superpriority given to the unpaid vendor is troubling as discussed
above. The registered chargeholder is protected against subsequent registered chargeholders. The non-possessory registered chargeholder gives public notice of his encumbrance
over the charged property. Thus, among registered chargeholders, there is no problem

Spring 1997

91

concerning "secret encumbrances." However, there are two other types of charges created
by the EBRD Model Law, the unpaid vendors charge and the possessory charge, each of
which can create a secret encumbrance, of which there is no public notice. The registered
chargeholder is not protected from claims of the credit seller who has obtained an unpaid
vendor's charge. That result has a negative impact on creating an effective secured financing system for lender credit under the EBRD Model Law. (See discussion of Question 4,
above.)
If charged property is sold, the chargeholder does not automatically have any interest
in the sale proceeds. (Commentary to Art. 5.10.) That restriction makes restrictions on
the sale of the charged property quite important. The Model Law offers effective protection against purchasers of goods covered by a charge. Under the Model Law, buyers of
charged property are also subject to constructive notice concepts, and they will hold the
charged property subject to a registered charge. (Art. 21.)
There are, however, several exceptions to this doctrine, the most important of which
concerns the buyer of inventory from a merchant. If the buyer purchases charged property
which is inventory, then that buyer will take the goods free and clear of the charge, but
purchasers of other charged property, such as equipment, will take the property subject to
a charge. (Art. 19.2.) This exception is necessary if any merchant is to sell its inventory.
That is the balance struck in most viable secured financing systems.
It is not known whether the interests of registered chargeholders will be protected in
insolvency proceedings. The drafters were instructed not to include insolvency law provisions within the Model Law because the insolvency law of the affected nations was so varied and was also likely to change. Thus, the EBRD drafters did not include provisions
relating to insolvency proceedings, so that important issue is still undecided. Since that is
the primary risk to many creditors, the utility of the charge created by the Model Law
remains in doubt until that issue is firmly resolved on a state-by-state basis.
They did draft four basic principles to guide local adaptation and a commentary
which emphasizes the need to protect the chargeholder in insolvency proceedings. One of
those principles, however, accepts the idea that other creditors (the tax authorities,
employees) may rank ahead of the chargeholder. If that is accepted, the charge of the
Model Law may be of little value. The resolution of this issue also depends upon the
nature of the chargeholder's interest. If it is a "right in rem" (Art. 1 commentary), then
obtaining protection in insolvency proceedings becomes feasible. However, if it is merely a
right to share in proceeds after a "failure to pay" and the successful exercise of "protective
measures" some of those steps have not occurred in the typical insolvency proceedings,
and the tax authorities can argue for higher priority to the sale proceeds.
To sum up this description of the registered charge, the Model Law creates a non-possessory registered charge which has the requisites for legal viability and commercial usefulness. Registration is required and constructive notice concepts apply to protect its priority
against subsequent registered charges. The registered charge can cover after-acquired property and apply to future advances. Registration seems easy and straightforward, although
the fee structure is not specified and a greedy one could ruin the system. The chargeholder
has a reasonable arsenal of enforcement devices, some of which could be abused, but in
many situations their use is dependent upon the inclusion of an acceleration clause in the
original contract. Although the registered chargeholder is well protected against subse-
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quent registered chargeholders and most buyers (but not buyers of inventory), he remains
vulnerable in insolvency proceedings and to subsequent non-registered chargeholders,
such as credit sellers.

IV. How Would the EBRD Model Law System Work in Practice?
As a first step, this EBRD project takes many useful steps to acquaint Central and
Eastern European countries with the basic concepts concerning secured transactions. It
acquaints them with: 1) registration of secured transactions; 2) constructive notice to later
purchasers through such registrations; 3)inclusion of after-acquired property and some
types of future advances in the secured transactions; 4) valid general descriptions of
charged property; 5) enterprise charge administration; 6) granting priority of some interests in their order of registration; 7) consensual enforcement of charges through direct
creditor contact with debtors; and 8) distribution of proceeds of sale of the collateral primarily to the creditor, rather than to the taxation authorities and other unsecured creditors.
Even enacting only part of the Model Law's provisions will be helpful to provide experience in secured transactions and the economic utility of those transactions. If the cost of
the transaction is higher than it should be, the fact will become apparent with use, and
later legislatures can enact cost-effectiveness amendments. In other words, these nations
will get initial experience with low-level transactions, allowing entrepreneurs to obtain
goods (equipment and inventory) on credit. If that is the EBRD's economic goal, then it
can be accomplished.
However, as the final legislative step, although the system drafted by the EBRD provides some security to creditors, there are serious gaps in the protections available to
secured lenders. The Model Law is based upon the doctrinal distinctions between those
who provide goods on credit (credit sellers), and can retain title, and those who provide
"only" the funds (lenders). This distinction is pervasive and affects many aspects of the
Model Law. These concepts are based on title manipulation devices, and give enough of a
preference to credit sellers to discourage lenders from participating in this market
The EBRD Model Law does not treat these two types of creditors equally. Instead, it
has one set of rules for lenders and a different set of rules for credit sellers (unpaid vendors). It leaves unpaid vendors virtually outside the system, insofar as the system is
designed to protect all creditors against the possibility of double-financing. While the
lender must register its interest, and has priority in the time order of its registration, an
unpaid vendor gives no notice, public or private, of his security interest to other creditors.
No public registration is required. There is no private notice to other creditors who have
already loaned money to the debtor (possibly to acquire the unpaid vendor's goods) and
publicly registered their interests. Further, the unpaid vendor has priority over all registered charges (a superpriority).
The result can be seen when a hypothetical lender attempts to take a security interest
in a debtor's inventory. To be certain of the priority of his interest, he must investigate and
determine that all vendors who sold the current inventory to the debtor have been paid in
full. However, as that inventory is in turn sold by the debtor and then replaced, the lender
can still lose the priority of its interest on the newly purchased inventory, unless it investigates each new transaction with each vendor to determine that the vendor has been paid in
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full. If the lender does that, it will be labor-intensive and expensive, and the cost will be
passed on to the debtor. It is more likely, however, that the lender will simply devalue the
security and give the debtor neither a better interest rate nor more credit availability than
an unsecured loan.
If the economic goal, however, is to have significant impact on the private economy by
providing significant amounts of new funds to entrepreneurs at low, secured credit rates,
then the analysis must be more guarded. The type of credit which will be enhanced by this
law is seller credit (trade credit), not lender credit Seller credit is usually low-limit and
short-term credit, and often is tied to the purchase of specific goods and binds an entrepreneur-debtor to particular suppliers, which has an incidental possibility of monopoly
problems. In other words, the EBRD Model Law promotes seller credit at the expense of
lender credit, tying the entrepreneur-debtor to particular suppliers of goods at potential
monopoly rates, and discouraging banks and other lenders from engaging in such business.
A lender considering making a secured loan to an entrepreneur under the Model Law
risks that others have better priority to the collateral. This is due to two types of limitations on the concepts of the Model Law. One is the fact that it has different rules for
lenders and credit sellers. This means, as discussed above, that the lender must vigilantly
supervise the debtor's purchasing and payment policies or risk losing the collateral to an
unknown, unregistered "unpaid vendor."
The second limitation is that the Model Law does not seek to cover all of the assetbased financing methods. There are many of these, including financial leasing, factoring
and trust receipts.
Thus, a lender which seeks to lend on the basis of inventory, accounts and equipment
may find that it has no commercially useful protection. The inventory that it thought the
debtor purchased with the loan funds is in fact subject to an unregistered unpaid vendor's
charge, as discussed above.
The equipment that it thought the debtor purchased with the loan funds is in fact
leased from an equipment leasing company. It will have no notice of this fact in the registry, but the leasing company has a better claim to the equipment than does the lender.
The accounts may have been sold to a factor, or the revenue stream may have been
sold to third parties, which can deprive a lender of its claim to accounts. Neither the current law in Central and Eastern Europe nor the Model Law will provide the lender any certainty of protection or enhance the lender's position because of the failure to cover sales of
accounts or chattel paper.

V. Condusion.
The EBRD Model Law on Secured Transactions provides a fairly workable registered
charge system. The system is available to all creditors and debtors; the charge is easy to
create and enforce; the creditor controls sales of the collateral after repossession; and the
first chargeholder to register has priority over later registered charges. The EBRD drafters
did not include insolvency proceeding provisions in the Model Law itself, but plan to do so
on a state-by-state basis. Until the principles announced in the Model Law are drafted into
statutory provisions, it is impossible to judge the total utility of the whole system. A system which subordinates the chargeholder to the tax authorities and other creditors in
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insolvency proceedings would be less effective.
However, after providing a fairly workable registered charge system, the EBRD Model
Law presents only a partially developed, poorly integrated set of provisions on other types
of financing devices, ranging from the unpaid vendor's charge to factoring to financial
leasing. The Model Law provides two "loopholes" to the registered charge concept, which
severely undermine the registered charge system. The loopholes arise out of the possessory charges and an unpaid vendor's charge, and the Model Law would be more effective if
both were omitted from its provisions. The possessory charge is poorly defined and therefore not limited to its appropriate uses. The unpaid vendor is given an unregistered charge
with superpriority over all registered charges, which will make non-vendor lenders hesitate
to place any significant value on any charged property which the debtor purchases from
any vendor. This will impede inventory and equipment loans by lenders and limit competition in this market. Thus, the debtor would get little benefit from such secured transactions, and the registration system is evaded and subverted.
It is important to concentrate on those provisions in the Model Law which are necessary to the effective operation of the registered charge itself. For example, the Model Law
seeks to persuade the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to adopt registries which
have the necessary attributes of low cost, certainty, accuracy, speed in registration and
speed in retrieval of information. It also seeks to persuade these countries to adopt
enforcement mechanisms which obtain quick value in an efficient manner - realizing a
high proportion of actual value and keeping administrative costs low, and allowing the
secured creditor to control the sale of the collateral to promote efficiency.
Under the current law in these jurisdictions, unpaid vendors may have title retention
devices, but their efficacy is open to some doubt, especially against good faith purchasers,
and the enforcement powers available under them arise under older laws and are limited
and less efficient. The Model Law would give unpaid vendors certainty of position and
modern, reliable enforcement powers, but without any burdens. They would not have to
register or even notify currently registered chargeholders. Since unpaid vendors receive all
the advantages of the Model Law system without any of its burdens, it will be difficult for a
nation which enacts this law to take any further steps to actually incorporate them into the
system. Unpaid vendors would resist any additional burdens if they already have all the
advantages of the law. It would be preferable to drop both of those concepts from the
Model Law until the Central and Eastern European nations have more experience with
effective registered secured transactions in movables.
It is clear that reform of secured transactions law in Central and Eastern European
nations will not be accomplished in a single step. As a first step, the Central and Eastern
European nations have not and probably will not enact the entire Model Law provisions.
The EBRD may not even expect them to do so. They do need, however, to enact a registered charge system which will give them experience with a secured transactions system
which is more effective. Hungary and Poland are attempting to take that path, adopting a
registered charge system, but omitting the unpaid vendors who will continue to have whatever security is available under the prior law, but will not have the benefits of the new legislation such as certainty of priority, protection from good faith purchasers, modern
enforcement provisions and control of resale of the collateral. More experience with more
effective secured transaction systems could then lead to subsequent enactment of a more
comprehensive secured financing system which would cover all secured creditors. .Until
then, it is preferable to leave unpaid vendors outside the system, rather than to include
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them in a manner which subverts the registration system.
The actions of Hungary and Poland to omit unregistered unpaid vendors from the
system may be preferable. That approach denies unpaid vendors who do not register any
of the benefits of the new law, forcing them to choose. They may either rely on title retention and eschew the new law, or eschew their title retention rights and register under the
new law to obtain its benefits. If the secured transactions law in these nations develops
further in the future, it would be more feasible to persuade unpaid vendors to bear the
burdens of registration in order to obtain the advantages of certainty of protection against
third parties and modern enforcement techniques, which do not enforce charges only
through courts and bailiffs.
This author believes that the most worthwhile result which could come from this
Conference would be for the EBRD to revise its Model Law. The revisions would be based
upon the comments and suggestions presented in the papers written for this Conference
and the discussions that ensued during it. During the Conference, the General Counsel of
the EBRD indicated a willingness to consider such a course of action. The EBRD could
then provide a Revised Model Law which would build on its current impressive strengths,
but amend the weak points identified. Those weak points will create disfunctionalities in
practice. The issuance of an EBRD Revised Model Law on Secured Transactions would
prove that it is in fact not engraved in stone, but is a living document which adjusts to economic realities.

